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Georgia: country risk for P2P lending (grade C)

Our country memo for Georgia: can borrowers pay, will the rules change, will the currency hold, and can lenders recover money? Grade C, 2.86 out of 5.

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Georgia: country risk for P2P lending (grade C)

Key takeaways

  • Country grade for Georgia: C (2.86 out of 5), written 13 September 2026.
  • The grade looks at regulation, the currency, the economy, geopolitics, the courts, politics and the state's finances.
  • 1 lender memo on Crowdinform use this country grade.
  • A country grade is general information, not advice: capital is at risk on every P2P platform.
In this guide
  1. The answer
  2. Loan originator memos for Georgia
  3. Who borrows from loan originators here
  4. Loan originators lending in this country
  5. Platforms offering loans from Georgia, by product
  6. 1. Can borrowers keep paying?
  7. 2. Will the government change the rules?
  8. 3. Will the currency hold?
  9. 4. Could politics or conflict break the business?
  10. 5. Can a lender get its money back through the courts?
  11. 6. Our verdict
  12. What we could not find out

How risky is Georgia for investors who lend through P2P platforms? Our country memo looks at five questions: can borrowers keep paying, will the government change the rules, will the currency hold, could politics break the business, and can lenders recover money through the courts. Our grade for Georgia: C (2.86 out of 5).

Ccountry grade, A (best) to E
2.86score out of 5, written 13 Sep 2026
1lender memos on Crowdinform for Georgia

Written 13 September 2026 · Applies to every loan originator lending in Georgia (Eleving's Mogo LLC is the only one on the retail platforms) · Review again after the Constitutional Court rules on the case to ban the three largest opposition parties, after any EU decision on visa-free travel, and after the National Bank's next financial-stability report

THIS IS NOT FINANCIAL ADVICE. This country memo was prepared with the help of AI from publicly available documents. It is general information for education only. It is not investment advice, not a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any loan, note or security, and does not take account of your personal circumstances. Figures, calculations and conclusions may contain errors — verify them against the original filings before acting. Investing through P2P platforms can result in the loss of all money invested. If in doubt, consult a licensed financial adviser.

The answer

Country gradeFramework limitBiggest riskGetting better or worse?
C Elevated15% of a portfolio in Georgian LOsPolitics. A one-party state since the disputed election of October 2024 — EU accession frozen, opposition leaders jailed, a court case to ban the three main opposition parties, US sanctions on the ruling party's founder — sitting on top of an economy that has, so far, ignored all of itEconomy better, institutions worse. Growth 7.5% in 2025 and near 8% in 2026, a lari that has strengthened, record reserves, two rating outlooks improved in 2026. Rule-of-law and press-freedom scores fell for a second year; the EU and US doors are closing

In plain words. Georgia is a country of 3.7 million people between Russia and Turkey whose economy has been one of the fastest-growing in Europe for four years — 7.8% in 2023, 9.7% in 2024, 7.5% in 2025 and about 8% in the first half of 2026. Its currency, the lari, has strengthened rather than weakened, its central bank has bought USD 2.1bn of reserves in six months to a record USD 7.5bn, public debt is 34% of GDP, and in January 2026 it borrowed USD 500m on the bond market at 5.1% with five times more demand than bonds. S&P moved its outlook to positive in August 2026 and Moody's back to stable in June. Wages are rising about 9% a year against inflation of 5–6%. Its politics have gone the other way. The ruling Georgian Dream party — founded and, according to the US Treasury, still controlled by the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, whom the US sanctioned in December 2024 — declared victory in an October 2024 election that observers called fundamentally flawed, suspended EU accession talks a month later, and has since jailed most of the opposition's leaders, passed more than twenty laws restricting civil society, media and protest, and asked the Constitutional Court to ban the three largest opposition parties. Protests have run for nearly two years. Russia occupies a fifth of the territory and the two countries have had no diplomatic relations since the 2008 war. The next election is due in 2028. For a lender the rules are stable and strict, and were written by a competent regulator after a debt crisis of its own making. Household debt reached 200% of disposable income in 2016; in 2017–2019 the National Bank of Georgia capped the effective interest rate at 100%, then 50%, capped penalties, imposed payment-to-income and loan-to-value limits, and made every lender with more than twenty loans register — which killed the online payday sector and left car-secured and gold-secured lenders standing. The cap has not moved since 2018. Today half the population has a loan, 375,000 people are more than a month behind, and three-quarters of them owe non-bank lenders. Georgia scores 2.86 — a C, with a framework limit of 15% of a portfolio: a strong economy, a workable rulebook and a good currency, discounted for a political system that no longer has a check on it.

Why the country matters so much for a loan originator. A loan originator (LO) earns its income from ordinary people repaying loans. Those people are usually on lower or middle incomes, so they are the first to fall behind when jobs go or prices outrun wages. The LO earns in one currency and may owe investors in another. And governments can change what a lender may charge overnight, which cuts the LO's income while its costs stay the same. So before looking at any single company, ask: can its borrowers keep paying, will the currency hold, and will the rules change?

Loan originator memos for Georgia

Each lender below has its own memo on Crowdinform: its accounts, licence, default odds and grade. The country grade on this page is one of the inputs to each of them.

Read nextP2P marketplaces explainedHow lending through a marketplace works.Read the guide →

Who borrows from loan originators here

Detail
Typical borrowerA working adult earning the average of 2,364 lari a month (about €780; first quarter of 2026, up 8.9% in a year) — men 2,836, women 1,902. There is no meaningful minimum wage: the statutory floor of 20 lari a month has not changed since 1999; the practical floor for a formal job is about 1,000–1,200 lari. Unemployment is 13.8% (17.5% in Tbilisi) and only 53% of adults are in the labour force; 31% of those working are self-employed, so income is often hard to document. Georgia's car-secured lenders (Mogo's product) lend up to 30,000 lari against a vehicle the borrower already owns.
What they borrow forConsumption. An ADB study of microfinance borrowers found 62% borrowed for general consumption, 39% for specific goods and only 6% for business; rural households borrow more than urban ones (45% against 23%). The microfinance sector's book is 1.55bn lari, three-quarters of it pawn loans secured mostly on gold; banks lend 38.7bn lari to individuals, up 16% in a year.
Where their income comes fromWages, self-employment, and family abroad. Remittances were 8.5% higher in 2025; the EU and US are now the largest sources after transfers from Russia fell 62% in early 2025. Since 2019 a lender may not lend without checking income, and a borrower's payments may not exceed 20–35% of income if the loan is unhedged (25–50% if hedged) — tightest for incomes under 1,000 lari.
What hits them firstPrices and their own debt. Inflation was 5.6% in August 2026 (transport +15% on the oil shock; the central bank expects about 5.2% for the year). The credit registry counted 1,996,116 people with debt at the end of July 2026 — about one person in two — of whom 375,188 were more than 30 days overdue on 3.06bn lari; 302,793 of the overdue borrowers owe microfinance and lending entities against 102,415 at banks. The registry's own measure: 23% of the economically active population cannot repay their loans.
The numbers to watch for this groupGeostat's quarterly wage and labour-force releases; the National Bank's monthly inflation and money-transfer releases and its financial-stability report; Creditinfo Georgia's monthly borrower statistics (overdue borrowers by lender type); the NBG's microfinance sector data.

What this tells us. Borrowers are getting richer — real wages up about 4% a year, absolute poverty down to 7% — but they are also among the most indebted in this series: half the population with a loan, and three times as many non-bank customers in arrears as bank customers. The responsible-lending rules keep the worst excesses out, and the car-secured lender at least has a car to sell. Unemployment at 14% and youth unemployment at 30% are the weak spots.

Loan originators lending in this country

Loan originatorGroupWhat it lendsOur gradeMemo
Mogo LLC (Tbilisi; registration 404468688)Eleving Group (Latvia), through Eleving Stella UAB (Lithuania); Eleving reports an 89.78% effective stakeCar leasing and sale-and-leaseback up to 60,000 lari for up to seven years, all secured on the vehicle; scooter and consumer loans. Gross book 64m lari (€22m) at end-2024. Georgia is 5% of Eleving's net portfolio. Eleving Georgia LLC, a sister company, sells cars.See the Mogo LLC memoMogo LLC memo (this series)
Rico; Swiss Capital; CreditService+DomesticThe largest microfinance organisations by network (Rico about 900 staff and 67 centres; Swiss Capital 35 branches; CreditService+ 50 centres); pawn and consumer loans. Not on the P2P platforms.Not graded—
Crystal; MBCDomesticFormerly the largest microfinance lenders; both took microbank licences (MBC in December 2024, Crystal in 2025) and left the MFO sector, taking about 1,000 staff with them.Not graded—
Piazza Capital; Trust CapitalDomesticThe two non-bank lenders named in NBG sanctions in 2025–26 — fines of 17,300 and 23,000 lari for reporting and anti-money-laundering failings. Small.——

Summary. One P2P-funded originator in a market of about 30 microfinance organisations and an unknown number of registered lending entities. Georgian retail-platform exposure is Mogo LLC alone: €4.7m on Mintos, the only Georgian lender we found on any of the seven platforms surveyed. It is car-secured, which is the product the 2018 rules left viable, and it has not been named in any NBG sanction.

Platforms offering loans from Georgia, by product

Where a European retail investor can currently lend to Georgian borrowers, from the Mintos lending-company pages printed on 13 September 2026 (Risk Scores updated 9 July 2026). Platform data, not independently verifiable.

ProductPlatformLoan originatorGroupOutstanding on platformBuybackNotes
Car loans (leaseback)MintosMogo LLCEleving€4.7mYesRisk Score 8.9 (portfolio 10.0, servicer 8.5, buyback 9.1, cooperation 5.5) — behind Mogo LT, AS mogo and Mogo Rent at 9.3 and Primero and Renti at 9.1 in this series; average rate 10.47%; €13.1m book on the platform's count; €70.8m originated on the platform
Car and consumer loans (bonds)Frankfurt / Riga exchangesEleving Group S.A.Elevinggroup-widen/aGroup funding, not country-specific: €275m of 9.5% bonds due 2030 and €50m of 13% bonds due 2028, guaranteed by subsidiaries including Mogo LLC (see the Eleving group memo)

What this tells us. Less than €5m of retail P2P money, all in one company, at 10.5% — above Mogo IFN's 10.13% but below Mogo LT's 11.45% among Eleving's European originators, which is Mintos pricing the lari rather than the company. The 8.9 Risk Score, with a perfect 10 for portfolio performance (as Mogo LT, Mogo IFN and Primero also have), is among the highest in this series but behind Mogo LT, AS mogo and Mogo Rent at 9.3; the 5.5 for cooperation structure sits in the same low band as the group's other subsidiaries (Mogo LT 6.0, Mogo IFN 5.7, Primero 4.0).

1. Can borrowers keep paying?

202420252026 forecastLatest 2026TrendWhat it means for borrowers
Economic growth (GDP)9.7%7.5%6.4–6.5% (IMF, Moody's, S&P)+8.0% y/y (July); +9.1% (Q1)▲ very strongICT, transport and education services have replaced the 2022–24 Russian-inflow boom; a USD 6.6bn UAE property project is the named upside. GDP per head about USD 10,300.
Inflation (prices)1.1% average3.9% average; 4.0% at year-end4.7% (IMF); ≈5.2% (NBG)5.6% (Aug)▲Transport +15% and utilities +8.5% on the 2026 oil shock; core 3.6%. The NBG raised its rate to 8.25% in May and says it will keep tightening moderately.
Wage growth (nominal)—2,283 lari average—+8.9% (Q1, y/y)▲2,364 lari (≈€780) in the first quarter of 2026; finance 5,950, ICT 4,290.
Real wages (pay minus inflation)———≈+4%▲Derived from the two series above; the IMF calls real wage growth 'moderating but still solid'.
Unemployment—13.9%—13.8% (Q2)► high224,000 unemployed; participation 53%, employment rate 46%; women's participation only 42%; Tbilisi 17.5%.
Youth unemployment—30.3% (15–24); 39% (15–19)——► very highThe IMF names skill mismatches and weak work incentives at low wages. A net 240,000 citizens left in 2015–25; the balance turned slightly positive in 2025.
Poverty9.4% absolute; 45.6% on the World Bank's USD 8.30 line7.1%; 42.2%40.1% (WB line)—▼ improvingNational line: rural 9%, children 9.2%; relative poverty 17.3%; Gini 0.34. The subsistence minimum is about 280 lari a month.
Household debt—private credit 65.9% of GDP—1,996,116 people with debt (July)► heavy375,188 overdue 30+ days (3.8% of all loans); 23% of the active population 'unable to repay' on the registry's measure; no current household-debt-to-income figure is published (200% of disposable income in 2016).
Non-bank lending sector31 MFOs; assets 2.27bn lari; profit 134m29–30 MFOs; book 1.55bn lari, 1.17bn of it pawn—302,793 non-bank borrowers overdue► shrinking, consolidatingThe biggest MFOs are converting to microbanks; the per-borrower cap for MFOs doubled to 200,000 lari in May 2025.

What this tells us. The strongest growth in this series — three years above 7% — with real wages rising, poverty falling and a banking system the IMF calls well capitalised, liquid and profitable (bad loans 2.5%). Against that, the deepest household leverage: one person in two with a loan, a third of a million people in arrears, and three times as many non-bank as bank borrowers among them. The 2016 crisis — 18 million loan contracts held by 2.4 million people — is the reason the rules exist, and the numbers say it has not fully gone away.

2. Will the government change the rules?

RuleTodayChanged recently?Change coming?Effect on an LO
Maximum cost of a loanCivil Code: the effective annual interest rate on a loan may not exceed 50%; late-payment penalties may not exceed 0.27% a day or, in total, 1.5 times the outstanding principal; early-repayment fees are capped at 2% of the remaining principal.No — set at 100% in 2017 and 50% in 2018; unchanged sinceNone found; no draft law targeting non-bank lenders in 2025–26A 50% ceiling on the all-in rate rules out the 30-day payday product (which left in 2018–19) and leaves the secured, longer-term lender. Mogo's income is about 47% of its average book — at the ceiling.
Who supervises and licenses lendersThe National Bank of Georgia supervises banks, microbanks (since 2023), microfinance organisations (minimum capital 1m lari; loans up to 200,000 lari per borrower) and 'loan-issuing entities' — anyone with more than 20 loans must register and is supervised from 2019. The NBG publishes fines: Piazza Capital (17,300 lari, May 2026) and Trust Capital (23,000 lari) for reporting and anti-money-laundering failings.Consolidation: the largest MFOs became microbanks in 2024–25; the MFO per-borrower cap doubled in May 2025The IMF names consumer lending and non-bank activity as 2026 watch items; NBG fraud-protection measures (a two-day hold on high-risk transactions by over-60s from September 2026)A capable, orthodox supervisor that has already done its big reform; enforcement is administrative and small.
Responsible lendingNBG 'Regulation on Issuing Loans to Natural Persons' (1 January 2019): no loan without a solvency analysis; payment-to-income ceilings of 20–35% for unhedged borrowers (25–50% hedged), tightest below 1,000 lari of income; loan-to-value 85% for lari loans and 70% for foreign-currency loans.No — in force since 2019None foundCaps demand from the poorest borrowers; a car-secured lender at 85% LTV is inside the rule.
Currency of lending ('larisation')Retail loans below a threshold may only be made in lari: 200,000–300,000 lari in 2019–23, raised to 400,000 (May 2024), 500,000 (January 2025), 750,000 (August 2025) and 1,000,000 lari (1 July 2026).Yes — loosened four times as the lari strengthenedDirection is towards less restrictionEvery consumer loan an LO makes is in lari; if its funding is in euros, it carries the currency risk itself (see question 3).
Retroactive interventionNone found. In the 2020 pandemic the NBG offered a USD 200m swap line to microfinance institutions (as well as USD 200m to banks) and banks granted a three-month grace period; the state did not rewrite loan contracts by decree.NoNone identifiedThe contrast with North Macedonia's 2020 decree and Moldova's practice is the strongest point in Georgia's favour.
TaxesCorporate profit tax 15%, charged only when profits are distributed (the 'Estonian model'); retained profits are untaxed. Transfer-pricing audits of related-party interest are active — Mogo LLC has been in a dispute over 2016–18 since 2019.NoNone identifiedRetaining profit is tax-free, which is why Georgian subsidiaries of foreign groups hold thick equity; extracting it costs 15%.
Is lending a political issue?It was, in 2016–18 — the debt crisis, mass repossessions and the cap were a ruling-party project. Since 2024 politics has been about the EU, Russia and the opposition, not about lenders.QuietNo election until 2028; a populist turn against lenders is possible but not signalledThe state that halved the rate cap in 2018 could do it again; nothing suggests it plans to.

Stress test — what the rules and the currency could do to an LO's €100

We take a typical LO's €100 of income from the Eleving group memo (running costs 41.6, bad debts 20.6, interest 17.5 — about €80 of costs that do not fall when income falls) for a lender pricing at today's 50% ceiling and funding half its book in euros. The currency column replays a 2020-style fall of 20% in the lari: local costs fall in euro terms, the euro interest bill does not, and the euro debt is revalued once.

Today (APR ≈50%)Ceiling 40%Ceiling 30%Lari −20%, half the funding in eurosCeiling 40% and lari −20%
Income per €100100806010080
Costs that do not fall8080808282
One-off loss on euro debt———1515
Left over+200−20+3−17
Can it still pay its lenders?YesBreak-even at the ceilingNoJust — the cushion takes the revaluationNo

What this tells us. Georgia's ceiling is among the lowest in this series — level with Moldova's 50% and above Romania's ≈35% and Estonia's ≈45% — but it has stood for eight years and the regulator that set it has since been loosening, not tightening. The live risk is the currency, not the rulebook: a lender whose loans are all in lari (by law) and whose funding is in euros (by choice) loses a fifth of its euro income and takes a one-off hit on its euro debt if the lari repeats 2020. The company memo should therefore start from how much of each originator's funding is in euros and whether it can borrow in lari — Eleving says it uses Mintos precisely as a lari funding line, and Mogo LLC has almost no debt at all.

3. Will the currency hold?

ValueWhat it means
CurrencyGeorgian lari (GEL), floating. 3.02 lari per euro and 2.60 per US dollar on 11 September 2026; the lari is up 3.7% against the dollar in a year and 25% from its all-time low of 3.47 in March 2020. Against the euro it has ranged 2.98–3.18 in the six months to September 2026.A currency that has appreciated through a political crisis — but a floating one with a history of 20% falls (2014–16, 2020).
Central bankPolicy rate 8.25%, raised from 8.0% in May 2026 and held on 9 September with a tightening bias; inflation target 3%. Governor's board independent by law; 200 NBG staff publicly opposed the November 2024 EU decision. The IMF endorses the floating rate with interventions limited to smoothing.Orthodox and, so far, independent.
ReservesA record USD 7.53bn at end-July 2026, up about 50% in a year after net purchases of USD 2.1bn in the first half; 119% of the IMF's adequacy measure, from 79% in 2024; 13.5% in gold. Still only 2.9 months of imports.Rebuilt fast; import cover remains the weak spot Fitch and the IMF flag.
External positionCurrent-account deficit 2.6% of GDP in 2025 — a historic low — widening to about 5% in 2026 on oil prices and weaker tourism (nearly 7 million visits in 2025, most from Russia). Trade deficit 18–20% of GDP, covered by services and transfers. External debt down from 70% to 61% of GDP.Better than at any time in a decade, with 2026 the first test.
DollarisationAbout half of deposits (47.7% in 2025) and 42% of loans are in foreign currency, down from 53% and 45%; corporate lending 66% foreign-currency. Retail loans under 1m lari must be in lari.Halved from the 2016 levels but still high — a rating constraint for all three agencies.
Limits on moving money outNone found. No capital controls; free convertibility; the only restriction is the larisation rule on retail lending.An LO can pay euro investors.
Can an LO hedge?Only by borrowing in lari: Eleving describes Mintos as 'natural hedging through local currency funding' and was closing a 5m-euro-equivalent lari bank facility in early 2026. A lari-lending, euro-borrowing LO with no hedge carries the full mismatch.Hedging exists but is expensive; the memo tests a 20% move.

What this tells us. The best currency picture Georgia has had: record reserves, a strengthening lari, a low current-account deficit and a central bank that raises rates before it has to. It is still a floating currency in a small, dollarised economy next to Russia, and it fell about 20% in both 2014–16 and 2020. A lender funded in euros must plan for that; one funded in lari — or in retained profit, like Mogo LLC — need not.

4. Could politics or conflict break the business?

QuestionAnswerRisk
Is the government stable, and are elections coming?Stable in the sense of unchallenged: Georgian Dream declared a majority in the October 2024 election that the OSCE found marred by intimidation and the European Parliament (444–72) called incompatible with candidate status; it took 81.7% in the October 2025 local elections on 41% turnout with most of the opposition boycotting and no credible international observers. Eight opposition leaders were jailed in June 2025, eight more charged in November 2025, and the party has asked the Constitutional Court to ban the three largest opposition parties. Next election due 2028.● Warning
Is the country, or its banks, under sanctions?The country and its banks are not. Individuals are: the US sanctioned Bidzina Ivanishvili (December 2024, with a general licence covering companies he controls 'to avoid freezing the whole economy'), the former prosecutor general (2023), and — jointly with the UK — five senior police officials including the interior minister; the UK froze the assets of two senior judges in April 2025; the US suspended immigrant visas for Georgians in January 2026 and the MEGOBARI Act (sanctions and aid suspension) passed the House 349 votes in May 2025. A 2024 offshore-asset law raises sanctions-evasion concerns.● Watch
Is there armed conflict on or near its territory?Russia has occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia — about 20% of the territory — since the five-day war of August 2008 and recognises both as independent; no diplomatic relations since. No fighting since 2008; direct flights resumed in 2023; South Ossetia's leadership resigned in June 2026. The 2026 Middle East war has hit tourism from Israel and the Gulf.● Watch
Does it depend on a hostile neighbour?Russia is the largest source of tourists, a gas supplier (a leaked Gazprom contract caused a 'sabotage' investigation in January 2026) and, until 2025, of migrants and money; the 2022–24 boom has ended without a bust. Georgia banned the re-export of Western cars to Russia under sanctions pressure. Turkey and Azerbaijan are the trade and transit partners; China exited the Anaklia port in July 2026.● Watch
Could international payments be blocked?Unlikely. No controls; the banking system is dollar- and euro-clearing and IMF-praised; but the sanctions trajectory (MEGOBARI, EU visa measures) is the risk to watch.● Watch
Is corruption a practical obstacle?Less than in most of this series: Transparency International 2025 gives 50 out of 100 — the best in the region, but the lowest score since 2013 and down three points, which TI attributes to state capture rather than petty bribery. A former prime minister was jailed for money laundering in January 2026.● Watch
Have there been protests or unrest?Continuously since 28 November 2024: nightly demonstrations on Rustaveli Avenue, 460 detentions with documented ill-treatment in the first weeks, an attempted breach of the presidential palace on 4 October 2025, a December 2025 law banning sidewalk protests. The economy has not noticed.● Warning

What this tells us. Georgia's economy and its politics have decoupled: the fastest growth and the fastest institutional decline in this series at the same time. The exposure for a lender is not a coup or a war but a slow closing of doors — EU candidacy frozen, visa-free travel at risk, US sanctions widening — and a state that no longer has anyone to answer to if it decides to turn on a sector. So far it has not turned on lenders.

5. Can a lender get its money back through the courts?

QuestionAnswerRisk
If a borrower stops paying, how long does recovery take?For a car-secured lender, mostly outside the courts: Mogo LLC repossesses and sells the vehicle and sells the residual to collectors (its 2024 accounts show impaired portfolios sold at about 73% of carrying value). No published figures on repossession time or cost; a Georgian source on the procedure could not be found.● Watch
Are consumer contracts holding up in court?No rulings against non-bank lenders were found; the rules are enforced by the NBG administratively (fines, registration). The 2016–17 repossession wave (property repossessions up nine-fold in five years) was resolved by regulation, not by the courts rewriting contracts.● Watch
If the LO itself fails, does the insolvency system work?A modern Law on Rehabilitation and the Collective Satisfaction of Creditors has been in force since 2021; no test case involving a non-bank lender was found.● Watch
Are foreign lenders treated the same as local ones?In law, yes. In practice the tax authority has pursued transfer pricing on intra-group interest at Mogo LLC since 2019 (2016–18 audits, GEL 2.7m at stake, under appeal at Tbilisi City Court) — the kind of dispute a foreign-owned lender should expect.● Watch
Are the courts independent and predictable?World Justice Project 2025: 52nd of 143 (score 0.58, down two points), first in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, ahead of Bulgaria and Hungary; strongest on order and security (0.78), weakest on criminal justice (0.50). Against that: the US sanctioned four judges for corruption in 2023 and the UK two leaders of the 'clan of judges' in 2025; Freedom House cut Georgia to 51/100 (Partly Free) in 2026; the 2024–26 foreign-agent, grants and media laws have closed most independent watchdogs (114 community organisations in 2024, 37 in 2025; Rights Georgia, the main legal-aid provider, shut in January 2026).● Watch

6. Our verdict

QuestionScoreWeightWhy
Will the government change the rules?320%A 50% ceiling and penalty cap unchanged since 2018, PTI/LTV rules since 2019, a competent supervisor, no decree history, the larisation rule loosening — but a low ceiling, a regulator that halved it once, and a lending-in-lari rule that puts the currency risk on the lender.
Will the currency hold?315%Record reserves, a strengthening lari, a 2.6% current-account deficit, an orthodox central bank — set against a floating currency that fell 20% twice in the last decade, half-dollarised, 2.9 months of import cover, and a widening deficit in 2026.
Can borrowers keep paying?315%Growth 7.5–8%, real wages +4%, poverty falling — against unemployment 14%, youth 30%, half the population in debt, 375,000 in arrears, and three times as many non-bank as bank borrowers among them.
Could politics or conflict break the business?214%A fifth of the territory occupied by Russia, no diplomatic relations, EU accession frozen by both sides, US sanctions on the ruling party's founder and interior minister, MEGOBARI pending, visa-free travel at risk. No fighting since 2008.
Can lenders recover through the courts?312%WJP 52nd — first in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, though behind the Baltics and Romania in this series — but falling; sanctioned judges; a civil society and legal-aid sector largely shut down in 2025–26; car security makes the courts less necessary.
Is the government stable and honest?212%One party, a disputed election, jailed opposition, a case to ban the opposition, twenty restrictive laws, two years of protests; CPI 50 but at a twelve-year low and falling for state-capture reasons.
Can the country pay its own debts?412%BB positive (S&P, August 2026), BB stable (Fitch, May 2026), Ba2 stable (Moody's, June 2026); debt 34% of GDP; deficit 1.4%; USD 500m Eurobond at 5.125% with 5.5× demand; IMF surveillance only.
Weighted score 2.86 out of 5C100%Elevated — 0.54 below the B line of 3.40 and below Albania (3.12) and North Macedonia (3.09). The economy and the sovereign would be a B; politics and geopolitics pull it to a C.

What the grade means

GradeMeaningFramework limit — share of a portfolio in LOs from this country
A Low riskStable economy, euro or hard peg, predictable rules, working courts40%
B ModerateWorkable, with one or two things to watch25%
C Elevated ← GeorgiaReal risks in more than one area; rules or currency could move against lenders15%
D HighFragile — a shock in any one area would hurt every LO here5%
E SevereConflict, capital controls, sanctions, or a cap that makes lending unviableNothing

Our view. Grade C — Elevated. Our framework's limit for Georgia is 15% of a portfolio, counted across all Georgian originators together — which today means one company. Within that: the company memo should weigh how much of the originator's funding is in euros against a lari book, its yield against the 50% ceiling, the security it actually recovers on repossessed cars, and its exposure to the tax authority's transfer-pricing views on intra-group interest. What would move the grade up to B: a political settlement — the party-ban case dropped, opposition leaders released, a credible election — that reopened the EU path; or, failing that, two more years of the current economic performance with reserves above four months of imports and dollarisation below 40%. Politics at 3 and geopolitics at 3 would give 3.12; the currency at 4 as well would give 3.27 — still C. B needs the politics fixed. What would move it down to D: sectoral sanctions or a banking-system designation; a return to the 2020 lari; the Constitutional Court banning the opposition parties followed by a formal EU or US response against the state; or the government rediscovering lenders as a political target and cutting the ceiling below 40%. How to read these limits: the percentages are how our framework expresses country risk on a common scale, so that countries can be compared. They are not advice for any particular investor — see the box at the end.

What we could not find out

A current household-debt-to-income figure (the last published is 200% of disposable income, from 2016) and the microfinance sector's own arrears ratio — the NBG publishes both only as downloadable datasets we could not open; the Creditinfo borrower counts are used instead.

The number of registered loan-issuing entities and any licence revocations in 2024–26; the NBG's registers are downloads only and no revocation notice was found in the press.

Georgia's median wage (Geostat publishes averages only) and the share of informal employment (the ILO paper could not be read; self-employment at 31% is the proxy).

Annual average lari–euro rates for 2019–25 from an official series; the company memo uses the rates printed in Mogo LLC's own accounts.

The car-repossession procedure and its timing and cost, and any court practice on consumer contracts with non-bank lenders — searches in English and Georgian returned nothing usable.

Whether the tax authority's transfer-pricing position on intra-group interest (the Mogo LLC dispute) is being applied to other foreign-owned lenders.

Read nextHow to assess investment riskA practical guide to the checks that matter.Read the guide →

Capital at risk. Crowdfunding investments are not covered by deposit guarantee schemes, can lose part or all of their value, and may be hard to sell before the end of their term. This guide is information, not personal investment advice.

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Eugene Sokolovs Expert

Founder of Crowdinform

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