Regulated
Bonus running
Can sell early
- Risk level
- High
- Risk-return
- Medium
- Start from
- €50
Referral link · capital at risk
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Evergreen Finance London
United Kingdom
Evergreen Finance London lends small, short-term loans to people in Britain under the MoneyBoat name. Mintos investors lend it money and earn interest. Our memo scores it 56 out of 100, a C, and puts the chance it fails to pay within a year at about 4.5%.
Key figures
- Average rate
- 10.33%
- average, not guaranteed
- Loan portfolio
- €20,478,737
- Start from
- €50
Capital at risk. The rate is agreed, not guaranteed: if a borrower defaults you can lose some or all of your money.
Would AI invest?
AI 56 MediumOur AI gives this project 56 out of 100: Medium. How the AI score works
Information, not personal investment advice. The AI score rates the documents the platform publishes, can be wrong, and does not predict returns.
AI review
AILender memo · Evergreen Finance London · United Kingdom
Evergreen Finance London: how likely is it to fail to pay its lenders?
Evergreen Finance London Limited lends small, short-term loans to people in Britain under the MoneyBoat name. It has been doing so since 2014, it takes no deposits, and it is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. Mintos lists it as "Evergreen Finance (GB)". This memo asks one question: what is the chance it fails to pay its lenders back in the next 12 months, and why.
THIS IS NOT FINANCIAL ADVICE. This memo was prepared with the help of AI from publicly available documents. It is general information for education only — not a recommendation to buy, sell or hold anything, and it does not take account of your circumstances. Figures may contain errors; check them against the original documents. Investing through P2P platforms can result in the loss of all money invested.
Our score
56/ 100
C Watch
ABCDE
about 4.5%chance it fails to pay in the next 12 months
1 in 22the same number, put the other way round
Where that sits on our scale
Our framework caps this lender at 6% of a portfolio. That sits well inside the United Kingdom’s country limit of 25%, so it is the lender’s own 6% cap that applies. There is no parent company standing behind it, so nothing improves those odds. These caps are a convention of our scale, applied to every lender we cover. They are not advice about your money.
A profitable lender whose accounts never say what its bad loans cost
A few findings make us stop scoring and put the answer at 25% or more — a broken financial promise to lenders, an auditor who will not sign off cleanly. None of those is present here. Both sets of accounts we read were signed off clean, there are no dividends, and the business made real money in the year to March 2025. What holds it at a C is what the accounts do not separate: the cost of loans that were not repaid is buried inside one line with everything else it spends on getting loans out, and the previous year’s figures had to be corrected inside this year’s accounts — restated, in the accounts’ own word — because the way it counted them "contained a material inconsistency". Each figure below shows the odds as if that were the only risk the company faced.
💶 Earnings and safety cushion C
about 4%It kept £5.11 of every £100 of income in the year to March 2025 — but nearly half of its profit before tax came from taking back money it had set aside for customer complaints.
📉 Are its loans repaid? D
about 12%Twenty-nine per cent of its instalment book was more than six months late at the end of December 2025, and at March 2025 its accounts already set aside two-thirds of what customers owed.
🇬🇧 How risky is the United Kingdom? A
about 1%A safe country with a hard legal cap on the price of exactly this product. Our grade for the UK is B, not A — section 3 explains the chip.
⚖️ Anything else? D
about 12%£9.0m invoiced by a company its director has an interest in, ten new secured charges since 2024 whose size and rank nobody outside can see, and money owed in euro by a business that earns pounds.
1. Its accounts never say what bad loans cost.For most lenders, borrowers who do not pay are the largest single cost in the accounts. Here that cost is real but invisible. The profit-and-loss account has one line called cost of sales, £16.8m in the year to March 2025, and the note on it says only that it includes marketing and legal costs directly related to issuing the contracts. The restatement note shows that the charge for loans going bad runs through that same line: correcting the earlier year’s provision by £0.91m moved gross profit by exactly £0.91m. The money set aside on the balance sheet also rose during the year, from £16.5m to £31.6m — £15.1m as the figures are printed, though section 5 sets out why that opening £16.5m is itself about £1.8m out, which would make the rise nearer £13.3m. Money set aside normally only rises through a charge, so a rise of that size points to a charge at least as large. But two things stop it being a clean floor. The company’s own restatement note shows its provision also moving with interest it had recorded but not yet earned — revenue and the provision each fell by £2.57m with no effect on profit at all — so part of a movement can be bookkeeping rather than cost. And a charge of £13m or more would leave under £4m of the £16.8m cost-of-sales line for the marketing and legal costs the note says are in it, against roughly £12m on the originally filed basis and £14m on the restated one in the fifteen months before. Either those costs collapsed, or the earlier provision figures are wrong — and section 5 shows they do not reconcile. Whichever it is, the size of the charge is not recoverable from these accounts. The balance sheet does show the accumulated effect: customers owe it £48.0m and it has already accepted that £31.6m of that will probably not be collected — two-thirds of the gross amount owed, which includes interest charged as well as money advanced. This matters more than usual here, because the previous year had to be restated: the company’s own note says the way it worked those write-downs out "contained a material inconsistency as it failed to adequately reflect the credit risk", which cut the earlier year’s pre-tax profit by £0.91m, £0.73m after tax.
2. £9.0m was invoiced by a company its director has an interest in, and the accounts do not say what it supplies.In the year to March 2025 the company received invoices totalling £8,983,796 from a company in which its director holds an interest, after £11,826,545 in the fifteen months before. That is 36% of its operating costs in the latest year — cost of sales and administrative expenses together — after 53% in the fifteen months before. At the year end £1.9m of it was still unpaid, interest-free and repayable on demand. Money runs the other way too: companies in which the director has a significant interest owed it £1.11m on the related-party line — £0.86m at commercial rates and £0.25m interest-free, with a small trade debtor on top — and another company controlled by a shareholder had lent it £400,000. We could not establish what the £9.0m buys. More than a third of a company’s operating costs going to a supplier its own director has an interest in, on terms nobody outside the company can see, is a large part of the cost base that cannot be checked.
3. Ten new secured charges since 2024, and nobody outside can see what they cover or where they rank.A charge is a claim registered over a company’s assets, setting them aside for one lender ahead of others. Twelve are registered against this company and none has been marked satisfied — the register’s word for a charge cancelled because the debt behind it was repaid. Marking one satisfied is voluntary, so that tells us none has been cancelled, not that all twelve still secure a live debt. Ten were created since 2024, and five of those between March and June 2026, mostly in favour of one lender, Alt Income Investments Pte Ltd, with one in March 2026 in favour of Sia Deploi. We could not establish what those facilities are, how big they are, or where they rank against the security Mintos investors rely on. One older charge, created in October 2023, is in favour of the majority owner personally. It covers all the company’s land, buildings, fixtures, plant and machinery, with a fixed charge, a floating charge and a promise not to pledge any of it elsewhere. The register does not say what debt it secures, and the loans from directors that the March 2024 accounts showed had all been repaid by March 2025.
Why this number matters
Every investment carries risk, and risk is not really a letter or a mark out of ten. It is two plain questions: how likely is it that this company fails, and how much of your money would you lose if it did. Put those together and you can see whether the reward is worth it.
For Evergreen Finance London: about a 4.5% chance of failing in the next 12 months. If we assume about 30% of the money comes back in that case, the risk costs about 3.2% a year against the 10.33% the loans pay. That leaves roughly 7% on our numbers. That margin rests entirely on the 4.5% being right, and the accounts never separate what bad loans cost — the one figure that would most move it.
Show how this works
1. The rate is a promise, not a result
An advertised 10.33% is what you are promised if everything goes well. What you keep is that rate minus what failures cost you. So the rate on its own tells you very little — and the highest rates on a platform are usually the ones being paid for a reason.
2. Put a price on the risk
Risk cost = chance of failing × share of your money you would not get back. Nobody knows the second number in advance. How much comes back has varied widely from case to case. We use 30% back, 70% lost, as our own working assumption so that memos can be compared with each other — it is not a measured figure, and the answer moves a lot if you choose differently.
3. Compare like for like
Take two imaginary lenders. One pays 14% but has a 17% chance of failing within the year: the risk costs about 11.9% a year, leaving roughly 2%. The other pays 9% with a 2.5% chance: the risk costs about 1.8%, leaving about 7%. The bigger number on the screen can easily be the worse one.
Evergreen Finance London, worked through
| On our numbers | |
|---|---|
| Chance of failing in a year | about 4.5% |
| Loss if it fails (70%) | × 0.7 |
| Risk cost a year | about 3.2%, on the unrounded 4.55% |
| Rate offered on Mintos | 10.33% |
| Left after the risk cost | about 7% |
Two things this arithmetic leaves out. Small lenders fail more often than the rated companies whose history our odds come from, so 4.5% is a floor rather than a best guess. And a real failure does not arrive as a yearly cost; it arrives all at once, which is why how much you put in one place matters as much as the rate.
Where our number comes from: we score six questions out of five, weight them into a score out of 100, and convert that score into a chance of failure using the long-run default rates that S&P publishes for companies of each credit quality. Some findings override the score entirely and set the answer to at least 25%: lending more than half the owners’ money to people or companies connected to it, an auditor who will not sign off cleanly, an audit report carrying a material uncertainty about the business continuing, a broken financial promise to lenders — a minimum the company has to stay above — late payments to investors, or owners taking out more than the business earned two years running. A finding has to be about the company itself, not about its owner or the platform it lends through. None of them applies here, which is why this memo gives an estimated percentage rather than a 25% minimum. It is our own estimate from public documents — not a credit rating, not a market price, and not a promise about what will happen.
The company at a glance
What it is
A licensed high-cost lenderAuthorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority under firm reference 674154. Registered in 2011 as Quid 4 Payday Limited and renamed in 2014. It takes no deposits. It averaged 66 staff in the year to March 2025, up from 52, with a registered office in London and an office in Leeds.
Who it lends to
People, in small amounts, at a high priceLoans of £200 to £1,500 for terms of two weeks to six months, averaging about £400 over four months, at 0.79% a day — the legal maximum in Britain is 0.8% a day. Loans that have been restructured can run as long as 60 months. Its own site prices £400 over four months at £624.34 to repay: 288.35% a year as a fixed rate, or 1,267.9% as an APR — the APR annualises a four-month loan and compounds it, which is why it dwarfs the 56% of the amount borrowed — £224.34 on £400 — that this borrower actually pays.
How much it has lent
£265m+Across 600,000 loans since 2014. At the end of March 2025 its customers owed it £48.0m before write-downs and £16.4m after them.
Who owns it
Two people, no parent companyYisrael Nosson Perkel holds 80% and is chief executive; Jeremy Frederick Benjamin holds 20%. The accounts name Mr Perkel as the ultimate controlling party — their term for the person at the top of the ownership chain — and say there is no parent entity, so there is no bigger company behind this one. He had been the sole director since April 2017; the finance director, Andrew Forsyth, who joined the company in 2024, was appointed to the board on 1 April 2026.
Where an investor can lend to it
Platform
MintosListed there as "Evergreen Finance (GB)".
Borrowed from investors
€20.5mMintos’s own figure, read on 9 November 2026 — about £17.6m. It was €20.7m in our register capture of 20 September 2026, and Mintos’s overview page showed €21.4m a week before that. Mintos also shows a "loan portfolio" figure of €7.8m that Mintos does not define anywhere we could find.
Average rate
10.33%Read on 9 November 2026 — Mintos’s own figure (10.46% on 13 September 2026). Platform figures read on 9 November 2026.
Payments to investors pending
€0.09m13 September 2026 — €89,000 across its two positions, two to four days behind on average. That is 0.4% of what investors had lent it, against 1.0% across every lender on the platform that day, so it reads as ordinary settlement delay. It is not one of the findings that stops us either way: those come only from a company’s own accounts, never from platform data.
Mintos Risk Score
7.4Read on 9 November 2026; Mintos last updated it on 9 October 2026, with the same score and parts as on 9 July 2026 — Mintos’s own score, not ours. Its four parts: how the loans are performing 8.0, how well it runs collections 9.2, how good its promise to buy back late loans is 6.0, and how the deal is put together 4.0.
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Information, not personal investment advice. The AI score rates the documents the platform publishes, can be wrong, and does not predict returns.
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