Regulated
Bonus running
Can sell early
- Risk level
- High
- Risk-return
- Medium
- Start from
- €50
Referral link · capital at risk
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Extra Credit
Latvia
SIA Extra Credit lends to people in Latvia online under the Bino name, on a credit line. Mintos investors lend it money and earn interest. Our memo scores it 69 out of 100, a B, and puts the chance it fails to pay within a year at about 2.2%.
Key figures
- Average rate
- 8.74%
- average, not guaranteed
- Loan portfolio
- €20,099,420
- Start from
- €50
Capital at risk. The rate is agreed, not guaranteed: if a borrower defaults you can lose some or all of your money.
Would AI invest?
AI 69 MediumOur AI gives this project 69 out of 100: Medium. How the AI score works
Information, not personal investment advice. The AI score rates the documents the platform publishes, can be wrong, and does not predict returns.
AI review
AILender memo · Extra Credit · Latvia
Extra Credit: how likely is it to fail to pay its lenders?
SIA Extra Credit lends to people in Latvia online, under the Bino name. It has held a consumer-credit licence in Riga since October 2016, it takes no deposits, and it belongs to the Sun Finance group. Mintos lists it as "Sun Finance (LV)". This memo asks one question: what is the chance it fails to pay its lenders back in the next 12 months, and why.
THIS IS NOT FINANCIAL ADVICE. This memo was prepared with the help of AI from publicly available documents. It is general information for education only — not a recommendation to buy, sell or hold anything, and it does not take account of your circumstances. Figures may contain errors; check them against the original documents. Investing through P2P platforms can result in the loss of all money invested.
Our six-question score
69/ 100
B Sound
69 is a B. An earlier version of this memo set the grade at E because of the money lent to connected companies. On a re-check we could not be sure that risk is real, so the grade now comes from the score.
ABCDE
about 2.2%chance it fails to pay in the next 12 months
about 1 in 45the same number, put the other way round
Where that sits on our scale
On our scale a B grade carries a portfolio limit of 12%. Latvia’s country limit is 25%, and the tighter of the two applies, so the limit here is 12%. No one guarantees these notes, so nothing improves those odds. These caps are a convention of our scale, applied to every lender we cover. They are not advice about your money.
On the ordinary arithmetic this is a strong business. The one large question is the €22.4m it has lent to companies connected to it, more than everything its owners have in it
Our six questions give 69 out of 100 — a B, about a 2.2% chance of failing to pay within a year. One thing weighs on that. At the end of 2025 this company was owed €22.4m by connected companies, against €19.6m of owners’ money. Lending more than half the owners’ money to connected companies is normally a finding that makes us stop scoring. Here we could not be sure the risk is real: the figures are the company’s own and unaudited, they name no borrower, and the company owes those same connected companies even more, €33.6m. So it is not a veto. It is the main warning in this memo, and the warning-signals question scores 1 out of 5 because of it. Each figure below shows the odds as if that part of the picture were the only risk the company faced.
💶 Earnings and safety cushion B
about 1.3%It keeps €43.61 of every €100 that comes in, and the owners’ money is 27.3% of what it owns.
📉 Are its loans being repaid? C
about 3.8%Bad loans took €25.64 of every €100 in 2024. It publishes nothing about how late its own loans are; Mintos does for the part it funds.
🇱🇻 How risky is Latvia? A
about 1%Grade B on our country scale — 3.74 out of 5. See section 3 for why a B country shows an A here.
⚖️ Anything else we found D
about 7.7%The money lent to connected companies scores here, alongside a 2025 audit report we could not get and a regulator fine upheld in court.
1. The main concern: it has lent €22.4m to companies connected to it, against €19.6m of owners’ money.Its own figures for 31 December 2025 — four pages that no auditor has checked — show €21,146,400 of long-term loans to connected companies and a further €1,263,544 that connected companies owed it, €22.4m in all. The owners’ money in the business was €19,615,569. So what connected companies owe it is 114% of the whole cushion. Our limit is half the cushion, €9.8m. The €22.4m is 2.3 times that limit. We do not know who the borrowers are: the company’s own figures say the balances are with connected companies but name none of them, and no document we found gives a rate or a repayment date. We cannot work out the rate reliably either. It received €1,352,932 of interest in 2025, and nothing was owed to it by connected companies at the end of 2024, so the balance went from nothing to €22.4m during the year. Against the year-end balance that is about 6% a year; against the average balance outstanding it is about 12%. Both are our arithmetic, not a disclosed figure. One plausible destination is its Latvian sister company Finanza, which was funded by €30.6m of loans from connected companies in September 2025 — but nothing we read says so, and we are not asserting it. Why it is not a veto. We could not confirm who owes Extra Credit this €22.4m, which its own unaudited 2025 figures say is owed by connected companies. It owes those companies even more, €33.6m. If the two can be set against each other, the risk is small. If they cannot, the company’s cushion is tied up inside its own group. With no audit and no names we cannot be sure the risk is real, and our rules set a veto only when we are. An audited 2025 report naming the counterparties would settle it.
2. It owes those same companies more than it lends them — one reason this is not a veto, though not the end of the question.At the same date the company owed connected companies €33.6m, about €11m more than connected companies owe it. If the two could be set against each other, the risk would look very different. We still do not treat it as settled, for two reasons. Money lent out has already gone while money owed back is a promise the company’s own group controls. And the counterparties are not named on either side, so we cannot tell whether the same company sits on both sides, which is what set-off would need. We say this plainly because it is the strongest thing that can be said in the company’s favour, and a reader should weigh it.
3. On everything else, this is a strong business.Of every €100 that came in during 2025 it kept €43.61 after tax. That is €9.2m of profit on €21.1m of income, more than in either of the two years before. The share it keeps has slipped a little each year, because everything it spends has grown faster than its income. The owners’ money is 27.3% of everything it owns — a thick cushion by the standards of this kind of lender. Its 2024 accounts were signed off clean by BDO. Nothing was owed to investors and unpaid on 13 September 2026 either — nothing in the platform’s figures signals trouble today. That is why the concern above matters: this is not a weak company, but if the money lent inside its group cannot be set against what it owes the group, more of the cushion protecting your money is tied up there than is left to absorb a bad year.
Why this number matters
Every investment carries risk, and risk is not really a letter or a mark out of ten. It is two plain questions: how likely is it that this company fails, and how much of your money would you lose if it did. Put those together and you can see whether the reward is worth it.
For Extra Credit: about a 2.2% chance of failing in the next 12 months. If we assume about 30% of the money comes back in that case, the risk costs about 1.5% a year against the 8.74% the loans pay. That leaves about 7.2%. The sum rests on the score, and the score cannot price the concern about the money lent to connected companies: if that money could not be recovered, this arithmetic would not hold.
Show how this works
1. The rate is a promise, not a result
An advertised 8.74% is what you are promised if everything goes well. What you keep is that rate minus what failures cost you. So the rate on its own tells you very little — and the highest rates on a platform are usually the ones being paid for a reason.
2. Put a price on the risk
Risk cost = chance of failing × share of your money you would not get back. Nobody knows the second number in advance. How much comes back has varied widely from case to case. We use 30% back, 70% lost, as our own working assumption so that memos can be compared with each other — it is not a measured figure, and the answer moves a lot if you choose differently.
3. Compare like for like
Take two imaginary lenders. One pays 14% but has a 17% chance of failing within the year: the risk costs about 11.9% a year, leaving roughly 2%. The other pays 9% with a 2.5% chance: the risk costs about 1.8%, leaving about 7%. The bigger number on the screen can easily be the worse one.
Extra Credit, worked through
| On our numbers | |
|---|---|
| Chance of failing in a year | about 2.2% |
| Loss if it fails (70%) | × 0.7 |
| Risk cost a year | about 1.5% |
| Rate offered on Mintos | 8.74% |
| Left after the risk cost | about 7.2% |
Two things this arithmetic leaves out. The 2.2% comes from the score; it does not price in the €22.4m lent to connected companies being lost, and our stress test shows that losing half of it would take more than half the cushion. And a real failure does not arrive as a yearly cost; it arrives all at once, which is why how much you put in one place matters as much as the rate.
Where our number comes from: we score six questions out of five, weight them into a score out of 100, and convert that score into a chance of failure using the long-run default rates that S&P publishes for companies of each credit quality. Some findings override the score entirely and set the answer to at least 25%: lending more than half the owners’ money to people or companies connected to it, an auditor who will not sign off cleanly, an audit report carrying a material uncertainty about the business continuing, a broken financial promise to lenders — a minimum the company has to stay above — late payments to investors, or owners taking out more than the business earned two years running. A finding has to be about the company itself, not about its owner or the platform it lends through. We set one only when we are sure the risk is real and current. On its own unaudited figures this company crosses the first of them, but we could not be sure, so the answer comes from the score and the concern is set out above. It is our own estimate from public documents — not a credit rating, not a market price, and not a promise about what will happen.
The company at a glance
What it is
A Latvian online lenderRegistration 40103548796, at Skanstes iela 52 in Riga. It has held consumer-credit licence NK-2016-044 since 25 October 2016, and the licence is active with no restrictions. It takes no deposits.
Who it lends to
People, on a credit lineIt lends under the Bino name — a credit line, meaning an agreed limit the borrower can draw on, repay and draw again. We could not read the current price list: the company’s own site would not load for us.
How much it has lent
€43.5mLoans to customers at the end of 2025, from the company’s own four-page statement. A year earlier the audited figure was €31.9m.
Who owns it
The Sun Finance groupAS HSFE holds 98%; above that sits AS Sun Finance Group, a Latvian lending group operating in several countries. The group carries no credit rating.
Where an investor can lend to it
Platform
MintosListed there as "Sun Finance (LV)" — the group’s name, not the company’s. Two other lenders shown on Mintos under the same Sun Finance brand are listed separately: Finanza in Latvia, still in the group, and Luma in Sweden, which the group sold at the end of June 2026.
Borrowed from investors
€20.1mMintos’s own figure, read on 9 November 2026.
Average rate
8.74%Read on 9 November 2026 — Mintos’s own figure.
Payments to investors pending
None13 September 2026, the last time we read it; Mintos’s list read on 9 November 2026 does not show it. Nothing was owed to investors and unpaid on this position. That is the only figure Mintos publishes about whether the notes themselves are paid on time, and we checked it rather than relying on the platform’s delay lists.
Mintos Risk Score
8.0Mintos’s own score, updated on 9 October 2026 and read on 9 November 2026, not ours. Its four parts: how the loans are performing 8.0, how well it runs collections 8.6, how good its promise to buy back late loans is 8.7, and how the deal is put together 5.0. Mintos raised the buyback part in October 2024, cut it in October 2025 over funding diversification and in July 2026 for a lower capital ratio, and raised it again on 9 October 2026, from 7.8 to 8.7. The overall score went from 7.6 to 8.0.
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Information, not personal investment advice. The AI score rates the documents the platform publishes, can be wrong, and does not predict returns.
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